Recently, mechanisms which overcome the free rider problem and achieve Pareto optimality under imperfect information have been constructed. In this paper we provide various impossibility theorems which show the difficulty of achieving distributional goals when consumers' tastes are unknown. The results are developed for a particular game theoretic solution concept, that of dominant strategy; they could be extended if, instead, Bayesian equilibrium were the solution concept. As a way out we propose a second-best approach to welfare optimization.
? -R be a continuously differentiable function such that for any 0 E 0=
An agent is characterized by his valuation function, vj, his taste characteristic, 0O, and a vector, 7EHf, of welfare relevant characteristics other than his tastes for the public good; i might represent, for example, endowment or productivity.
The functional forms vi(., .) are assumed to be known publicly, but the true value Oi of the parameter Oi is known only to agent i, a priori. Similarly, Ai, the true value of m j, is, at the beginning, strictly private information. A mechanism is a procedure where agents announce messages, on the basis of which a public good level is chosen. The purpose of a mechanism is to determine an "optimal" level of the public good. An optimal level is one which maximizes a given social welfare function. This paper studies the class of social welfare functions which can be optimized by mechanisms in which agents announce characteristics as messages and where revelation of true characteristics is a dominant strategy. A mechanism where agents announce characteristics (not necessarily their true characteristics) as strategies is a revelation mechanism.
A mechanism is formally defined as a mapping, To prove an impossibility theorem, we can work with a small set of valuation functions, since any superset will then lead to impossibility a fortiori.
Consider 
VI. Conclusions
This paper demonstrates that, even for highly restricted domains of preferences, the possibilities of implementing SWF's other than a weighted sum (with constant weights) of marginal rates of substitution between public and private goods are highly limited. In particular, SWF's which incorporate elicited information about ability to pay rather than willingness to pay for a public good appear impossible, in general, to implement. Throughout, the solution concept we have imposed for implementing mechanisms is that of dominant strategies. One avenue for attaining more optimistic results would seem to be to weaken the solution concept. As we argued elsewhere,1 Bayesian equilibrium2 does not generally permit a wider range of SWF's to be implemented than does the dominant strategy equilibrium. Indeed, the four theorems of this paper all go through when Bayesian equilibrium become the solution concept.
Alternatively, one might adopt Nash equilibrium as the solution concept. More work needs to be done to determine the possibilities in this case. Maskin (1977) has shown that any social welfare function satisfying the properties of monotonicity and no veto power can be implemented by a Nash mechanism. On the other hand, Roberts3 has shown that when valuation functions are unrestricted and the social welfare function has a unique optimum, it can be Nash-implemented only if it is dominant-strategy-implementable.
An alternative direction, which we hope to explore in future work, is secondbest optimization. The results of this paper show that only a limited class of social welfare functions may be implemented. If a SWF of interest falls outside this class, one can "partially" implement it by optimizing instead the implementable SWF which best approximates it (in an expected welfare sense). Obviously, the worse the approximation, the more partial the implementation.
